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Asymmetric Information and Outcome-based Compensation 
in Health Care – Theoretical Implications Abstract 
The discussion about health care systems focuses on the dynamics of expenditures and on the 
weak growth of revenues. In this discussion it is widely overseen that medical expenditures 
and the supply of medical services depend crucially on the compensation of physician ser-
vices. The paper analyzes the implementation of an outcome-based payment system in the 
presence of asymmetric information. Two cases are studied in detail. First, the common situa-
tion of physician’s moral hazard is analyzed. Second, a double moral hazard model is devel-
oped. Here, the patient’s actions influence health outcome and cannot be monitored by the 
physician. It is shown that the choice of insurance and payment contracts depends on the 
characteristics of asymmetric information. In addition, lack of knowledge about health status 
and productivity of health inputs prevent a solution using outcome-based contracts. 
 
JEL-classification: I 11, I 12, D 82 





1  Introduction 
The political discussion about how to reform the health care system centers on the dynamics 
of expenditures and on failing growth of revenues. Especially the structure of financing, pay-
ment, and regulation in the field of health care aggravates the problems in this field of eco-
nomics (cf Schwartz et al. (1995)). But the discussion ignores one particularity of health care 
markets, namely the uneven distribution of knowledge about health status and treatment op-
tions. Asymmetric information, i. e. incentive compatibility is one of the prevalent topics in 
the health care market. The economic consequences of asymmetric distribution of information 
between two contract parties consist in the fact that one party might take advantage of the 
resulting scope. Moreover, in case of diverging individual goals it is possible that individual 
interests of both the physician and the patient are conflicting so that the optimal treatment 
quality is not always in the main interest. 
Although the physician-patient relationship is the key relationship in health care, the starting 
point of reforms is the revenue and expenditure situation. Especially in Germany it is obvious 
that health policy changed during the last decade. In the first half of the nineties, the focus of 
the discussion was on personal responsibility of the patient. Nowadays, the core of the discus-
sion is about the future of financing health care. Thus, personal responsibility of the patient 
and patient orientation has taken a back seat in the debate about the future design of the health 
care system as well as different payment systems for physician services. Against the back-
ground of this situation it is to analyze in how far an outcome-based payment system can be 
viewed as a step towards efficiency and higher effectiveness in health care.
1 The main interest 
of this paper is to show the consequences of asymmetric information for the formulation of 
insurance and payment contracts. Thereby, in addition to moral hazard of the physician the 
patient's health related behavior is also studied. In this situation of double moral hazard, the 
insurer has to consider the incentive effects of the contract parameters on medical services 
and the patient's compliance. 
                                                 
1 In other parts of the economy performance-based compensation systems appear on the agenda more often. 
From a theoretical point of view especially the vast literature about principal-agent problems can be seen as a 
starting point for performance- or outcome-based remuneration systems (see e.  g. Holmström (1979) and 
Holmström (1982)).   2
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two discusses basic principles of outcome-based 
compensation and deals with resulting implementation problems. Moreover, an overview over 
the literature concerning theoretical models of physician payment systems in general and out-
come-based systems is presented. In section three, the basic model is developed, followed by 
the derivation of optimal insurance and remuneration contracts: first, in the situation of physi-
cian moral hazard, and second if double moral hazard is present. The fourth chapter deals with 
the resulting implications for health policy. The paper closes with a conclusion. 
2  Outcome-based payment systems 
2.1  Basic principles 
The supply of physician services depends crucially on the underlying remuneration system (cf 
Schwartz et al. (1995), Pfaff / Nagel (1995) or Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte 
Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (2003)). In the case of a fee-for-service remuneration, the phy-
sician has an incentive to expand the quantity of supplied services. The use of a lump-sum 
payment instead leads to selection effects: flat rate payments encourage the physician to re-
fuse patients with difficult diseases and capitation fees have disadvantages if the patient’s 
treatment is cost-intensive. In other words, we find a selection with respect to health risks. If 
the health care provider earns a fixed salary it is possible that this has undesired effects con-
cerning his productivity. 
The idea behind outcome-based compensation systems is the separation of the provision of 
medical services from the remuneration. The major targets are a higher effectiveness and an 
efficient health care provision (cf Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Ge-
sundheitswesen (1998) and Stade / Stahlecker (2001)). The aim of a remuneration of health 
outcomes is a more suitability of providing health care; the focus of the treatment process 
needs to lie on health production. Therefore, it is necessary to verify the medical services 
supplied. On the one hand, medical procedures have to be analyzed with respect to their ef-
fectiveness and on the other hand, medical facilities should be audited with respect to their 
productivity. If one takes a look at the health care system today, a payment system that fo-
cuses on health outcomes is almost nonexistent.
2 If payment systems account for health out-
comes the patient would gain weight in the decision process. One of the main issues may be 
                                                 
2 For a survey of outcome-based payment systems see Lu / Donaldson (2000) or Krauth et al. (1997).  
3
that a patient has no ability to assess health care quality and professional skills of the physi-
cian. 
Generally, what is needed for an outcome-based payment system is a definition of outcomes 
of the health care process. Therefore, three conditions of health outcomes have to be consid-
ered. One possibility is a full recovery as a starting point for the remuneration of physician 
services. Unfortunately, situations in which a full recovery is not possible or not achievable 
with maintainable inputs are not covered in this environment. Especially in cases of multi-
morbidity or chronicle diseases, the physician often has to balance between treatment success 
and adverse effects of medical care. Here, an improvement in the health status may be an ade-
quate criterion for the remuneration. Moreover, there might be the case in which even an im-
provement is nearly impossible to achieve and stabilizing the health status can be viewed as a 
success from a medical perspective. In the end, the implementation of a payment system that 
is solely based on the improvement of the health status neglects these medical aspects and 
leads to an unjustified penalization of the provider of medical services. Thus it is necessary to 
find valid indicators to measure the effect of a medical treatment independent of the exact 
definition of health outcome. 
An important factor concerning the implementation of outcome-based payment systems is the 
transparency of the results of the health production process (cf Sachverständigenrat für die 
Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (1998), p. 357ff.). Here, not only the medical pro-
viders are in need to evaluate the medical treatment. In addition to informing the third-party 
payer it is necessary to involve the patient directly into the treatment process. First, the indi-
vidual comprehension of health outcome is necessary to encourage the patient to exhibit the 
bet possible health related effort. Second, the patient needs detailed information about the 
quality of health care. Beyond that, implementation of a payment system based on outcomes 
is only feasible in accordance with the medical providers. They must have a virtual interest 
for outcome-based remuneration.
3 Moreover, the position of a gatekeeper for medical services 
is central for the physician's future position in his relation to patient and insurer.
4 Especially 
the communication between physician and patient as well as the mutual information transmis-
                                                 
3 One advantage of outcome-based payment systems is that medical providers have an interest for vocational 
training in order to improve the service quality (cf NN. 2000, p. 24). 
4 This relation between physician, patient and insurer is known as health care triangle (cf Massialos / Dixon 
(2002), p. 2).   4
sion are of major importance (cf Schneider (2002a)). Here, it is worth mentioning that the 
physician-patient relationship should be settled on a basis of confidence. 
The implementation of such a remuneration system is somewhat problematic. One issue is the 
causal connection of outcome and medical services. Generally, a causal interrelationship can-
not be found because besides medical services numerous other factors like environmental 
effects, patient's self-healing capabilities and of course the present symptoms influence the 
treatment outcome. Therefore, a deterministic relation between inputs and outputs is unascer-
tainable. In practice, we observe several attempts to implement outcome-based or perform-
ance-oriented remuneration systems of physician services. There exist medical guidelines or 
modular concepts for payment systems. For the first alternative, the physician is assumed to 
treat the patient in accordance with existing guidelines to give him some kind of support 
about decisions concerning therapy and compliance.
5 A modular payment system as a second 
option consists of several components (cf Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im 
Gesundheitswesen (1998), p. 369ff.). These are e. g. a flat rate payment for covering the fixed 
costs of treatment, a charge for frequent and standardized services as well as a compensation 
for special services such as home visits or referrals to specialists. Moreover, the provider gets 
a results-orientated bonus in case of a successful treatment which may also be on the basis of 
a ‘group result’.
6  
2.2  Theoretical models of outcome-based compensation 
In health economics literature, only few papers explicitly deal with the question of compensa-
tion in accordance to patient-related health outcomes. The vast majority captures only the 
administrative effects of the implementation of such a payment system (cf Rochaix (1998) or 
Schwartz et al. (1995)). First of all, there is no clear distinction between outcome-based or 
performance-based remuneration. The latter incorporates the idea of guidelines where the 
input in the treatment process is important for its output. In contrast to this, outcome-based 
payment systems focus on the success of the treatment process.  
                                                 
5 Guidelines are systematically developed, evidence-based statements decided by consensus. They aim at giving 
decision and orientation guide to physicians and patients for medical treatment in the case of certain characteris-
tic conditions (cf Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen (1998), p. 382). 
6 Even these proposals of outcome-based payment systems face the problems mentioned above.  
5
In the theoretical literature about compensation of ambulatory physician services, most of the 
work concentrates on the contract design for physicians with regard to incentive compatibility 
and efficiency.
7 Performance- or outcome-based payments only play an underpart. Amongst 
this work, Zweifel (1994) was one of the first to develop a model about contracting between 
physician and patient that incorporates elements of outcome and effort. Using a principal-
agent framework with physician's moral hazard, the optimal contract is one that gives the 
physician a share on the monetary treatment outcome. This solution combines elements of 
outcome-based remuneration and effort-related payment systems. As long as a higher physi-
cian effort leads to a higher probability of a good health outcome, the remuneration increases. 
On the controversy, if the physician only provides a low effort level, the probability of a good 
outcome decreases and therefore, the remuneration decreases too. This solution has two main 
disadvantages. First, the patient’s signing of the contract is subject to some kind of urgency if 
he suffers a severe illness. Second, the patient is not in a position to put the physician’s fee 
into action. It follows that the patient needs help from so called complementary agents whose 
primary tasks are information brokering, negotiation and conclusion of contracts (cf Zweifel 
et al. (2001)). 
The starting point in the work of Stade / Stahlecker (2001) are the rising health care expendi-
tures. They aim at analyzing the influence of different remuneration regimes on physician 
services and therefore on the development of expenditures. Therefore, they model the relation 
between a sickness fund and a physician in the context of a principal-agent model using a 
combination of an outcome-based and a service-based remuneration. The physician (agent) 
maximizes his expected profits by treating a patient. The sickness fund acts as a principal that 
maximizes its expected profits with respect to the remuneration parameters. The main result is 
that a combination of outcome- and service-based compensation dominates a solely service-
based payment system. 
Leonard / Zivin (2003) assume that the outcome of the health production process is influenced 
by both the physician and the patient. This situation is called dual hidden effort. It describes 
the case where on the one hand the physician is unable to verify the patient's effort and on the 
other hand the patient has no exact knowledge about the medical effort of the physician. In 
                                                 
7 Examples of research in this field are the models of Ellis / McGuire (1990), Selden (1990), Ma (1994), 
Chalkley / Malcomson (1996), Kwon (1997), Ma / McGuire (1997), Chalkley / Malcomson (1998), De Fraja 
   6
this model a fee-for-service compensation is compared to an outcome-based remuneration 
system. The implementation of the negotiated contract lies in the responsibility of a third 
party, namely the employer or regulator. The most remarkable finding is that in the case of a 
complementary relation between physician’s services and patient’s effort an outcome-based 
payment dominates a fee-for-service payment. In all other cases a service-based remuneration 
is preferred. 
A model of performance-based payment is presented in Lu et al. (2003). The main focus is on 
the incentives on patient selection and matching if patient heterogeneity and asymmetric in-
formation are present. Performance-based contracts include a basic compensation and an op-
portunity for additional compensation adapted from measures such as quality of care and 
treatment outcomes. It is assumed that treatment performance depends on the severeness of 
illness and the intensity of treatment. By the use of a performance-based compensation system 
it is possible to reduce the mismatch between physician and patient. Moreover, this form of 
contracts leads a better match between illness severity and treatment intensity and to more 
referrals. 
To sum up, in the presented models the analysis concentrates on allocation purposes and ne-
glects the interaction between physician and patient. Only in the paper by Leonard and Zivin 
this subject is discussed. Nevertheless, all of these approaches omit the implementation prob-
lems associated with performance- and outcome-based remuneration systems. Therefore, the 
paper at hand presents a model of double moral hazard between physician and patient con-
centrating on health policy implications and implementation aspects. 
3  Asymmetric information and optimal insurance-provider contracts 
3.1  Structure of the model 
The model describes an agency relationship between physician and patient. In addition, an 
insurance company is incorporated. It consists of three stages (see Figure 1). At the first stage, 
the insurance company decides about the insurance and remuneration contracts. Here, the 
contract parameters are settled. At stage two, nature chooses the patient‘s state of health. If he 
is sick, he will visit the physician and demand medical treatment. In the other case, the game 
                                                                                                                                                          
(2000) or Jelovac (2001).  
7
ends. At stage three, the physician and the patient decide simultaneously about the medical 
services provided and the compliance. To solve this model, we use the method of backward 
induction, i. e. it is necessary to look at the treatment decisions of physician and patient first 
and then to incorporate these findings in the contract stage. 
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The patient has an initial wealth W and is risk avers in disposable income (U is concave). The 
probability of getting sick p is exogenously given, with p∈[0, 1]. In the case of sickness, the 
patient attains a health shock in monetary units L that depends negatively on the amount of 
consumed medical services m and on his compliance a, respectively. L is a convex function of 
both variables. This formulation implies diminishing marginal benefits of both inputs. The 
patient can purchase insurance for which he has to pay a premium σ. Moreover, in the case of 
treatment, he has to pay a fixed share β of the expenditures for medical treatment (coinsur-
ance: 0 <β <1)). These expenditures depend on two factors: First, the outcome of the treat-
ment h and second, a lump sum payment Φ. The outcome-indicator h is a random variable 
that depends on medical services and compliance and is restricted to the interval [0, 1]. It is a 
twice differentiable increasing function of the amount of medical services and compliance 
h(m, a). Moreover, it is assumed that h is concave in m and a. If it takes the value 1, the out-
come of the medical process can be interpreted as a full recovery. In the other extreme case 
where h=0, medical treatment and compliance take no effect on the state of health and so the 
patient suffers the full loss. Total expenditures for medical services are the product of out-
come and lump sum payment h(m)Φ. The patient‘s compliance in the case of illness is asso-
ciated with disutility D(a) which is a convex function of the compliance a so that in this case 























  EU=p U W - σ- β hm , aΦ - Lm , a - Da +1 - pUW - σ . 
(3.1)
 





















  U1 =U W -σ -β hm , aΦ - Lm , a- Da




If the patient is sick his income-related utility is U1, if he is healthy, he only has to pay the 
insurance premium and his utility is denoted U2, with U1<U2. 
The expected utility of the physician is additive-separable in remuneration and effort. For the 
medication he gets a lump-sum payment Φ which is directly related to health outcome h. In 
detail, this means that if the patient recovers fully (h = 1) the physician will receive the full 
payment Φ. If the health status of the patient remains poor (h = 0) the physician gets no pay-
ment at all. Overall, it is assumed that the physician is risk neutral because he is able to spread 
the income risk over all patients. The effort of supplying medical services is C(m) which is a 








 EV =p h m ,a Φ - Cm  
(3.2)
 
The insurance company is risk neutral and finances the health care expenditures in the case of 
an illness (p) against a premium σ. The insurance pays for all treatment costs except the co-









 σ=p 1 -β hm , aΦ   (3.3)
 
Considering the information structure, the following two model alternatives are considered. 
First, in a restricted model it is assumed that the patient reveals no compliance (a = 0). In this 
case, health outcome only depends on the physician’s actions. In the second case, patient’s 
compliance influences health outcomes and health shock and the insurer takes patient’s com-
pliance into account.  
9
3.2  Insurance contracts with asymmetric information and no compliance 
To develop some sort of benchmark regime, suppose that the patient’s compliance is not ac-
counted for by the insurance company and that the health outcome as well as the health shock 
only depends on medical services.




















  EU=pU W - σ - β hmΦ - Lm +1 - pUW - σ  
(3.4)

















 σ=p 1 -β hmΦ  
(3.6)
 
The insurer is unable to observe the medical services provided by the physician. The latter 
maximizes his expected utility of treatment on stage three (p = 1) by choosing the adequate 



















Here, the marginal medical effort on the right-hand side equals the expected marginal benefits 
on the left. The latter depends on the marginal health outcome and on the lump-sum payment. 
For questions of contract design it is interesting how an increase in the lump-sum payment 
affects the provision of medical services. Therefore, by applying the implicit function theorem 
it follows from equation (3.7): 
                                                 
8 This corresponds to the situation in which the patient shows no health-relevant, treatment-accompanying activi-
ties at all. In this case, the patient exhibits no compliance and there is no disutility associated with his behavior. 
















  U1 =U W - σ - β hmΦ - Lm
U2 =U W- σ
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It is obvious that a higher payment has a positive effect on the medical services provided by 
the physician. The nominator is positive and condition (3.9) requires that the second order 
derivative of (3.7) in the denominator also is negative. Hence, in a world of asymmetric infor-
mation about the quality of the provided medical services it is important to note how a physi-
cian reacts if the lump-sum payment changes. The resulting condition is further referred to be 
the incentive compatibility of the physician.  
The implications for the contractual arrangements are analyzed at the contract stage. In anal-
ogy to Stewart (1994) it is assumed that the insurance company maximizes patient’s expected 
utility with respect to the coinsurance parameter and the lump-sum payment. The insurer con-
siders the following restrictions. First, the physician’s expected utility has to be at least as 
great as his reservation utility V  (participation constraint). Second, the insurance premium 
equals expected expenditures and third, the lump-sum payment has a positive effect on medi-









































  β , Φ pUW - σ -β hmΦ - Lm + 1 - pUW - σ
s.t. p hmΦ - Cm ≥ V







To simplify the analysis the zero profit condition of the insurer as well as the physician’s in-
centive condition are included in the patient‘s expected utility and the physician‘s participa-










                                                 
10 A detailed derivation of the results is presented in the appendix.  
11
It is clear from equation (3.11) that the marginal utility in case of an illness equals marginal 
utility if no treatment is necessary. Because of the concavity of the utility U this is only possi-
ble if the arguments of the utility function equal each other. For this to be true, two conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, the health shock L has to be absorbed, i.e. m has to be large enough so 
that the patient faces no loss. Second, the patient must not have any out-of-pocket expenditure 
for the medical care. In this case, the coinsurance parameter β is zero and the patient is fully 
insured.
11 
The first-order condition with respect to the lump-sum payment after using some algebra is 














































+p 1 - β hm p U
’
1 + 1 - pU
’
2
+pβ hm mΦ Φ U
’
1
+p 1 - β hm mΦ Φ pU
’





The expected marginal benefits of a higher lump-sum payment on the left-hand side equal the 
expected marginal costs of an increase on the right-hand side.
12 To begin with the benefits, 
they consist of two parts. First, the direct effect of an increase is the expected utility gain of 
the physician because his expected income rises. The second effect is indirect and comes from 
a better health status of the patient. The higher lump-sum payment increases the supply and 
use of medical services and the monetary health shock decreases. Considering the cost of a 
higher lump-sum payment on the right-hand side one has to distinguish between two direct 
and two indirect effects. The first term denotes the direct coinsurance effect. Given a higher 
lump-sum payment the patient c. p. has higher out of pocket expenditures. The second term is 
named the direct premium effect. The increase in the lump-sum payment c. p. raises medical 
expenditures. In order that the zero profit condition of the insurance company (equation (3.6)) 
remains valid the premium has to increase for both possible states of health, sick and healthy. 
                                                 
11 Note that if the monetary health shock cannot be reduced to zero by the use of medical care the coinsurance 
parameter is negative which means that the patient gets a payment to compensate the loss.  
This situation is ruled out by the assumption that the coinsurance parameter β has to be strictly larger than zero. 
12 The Lagrangian parameter λ can be interpreted as a fixed weight to the physician’s expected utility (cf Rees 
(1985), p. 21) In this case a Pareto-optimal situation is regarded under consideration of incentive compatibility 
conditions.    12
The last terms are the indirect coinsurance and premium effects. Both emerge due to an in-
crease in medical services which results from the incentive compatibility condition (3.9). As 
before, the indirect coinsurance effect is only relevant if the patient seeks medical treatment 
by a physician while the expected rise in the insurance premium takes also effect in the 
healthy state of nature. 
Note that some of the above effects vanish if no coinsurance is incorporated in the insurance 
contract. Together with the result obtained from (3.11) that the coinsurance parameter β is 
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Here, the direct and indirect coinsurance effects in the case of illness vanish. Moreover, the 
negative premium effects are no more suspended through the coinsurance which means that 
any rise in expected health care expenditures leads to an increase in the insurance premium 
depending on the probability of an illness (p). 
All in all, it is obvious that in a situation with no compliance the patient chooses full insur-
ance. This is because there is no moral hazard on the patient’s side. In contrast to this, the 
moral hazard of the physician remains a problem. The physician neglects the impact of his 
behavior on the patient when maximizing his expected utility. For that reason, outcome-based 
payments are set to equate the sum of expected marginal benefits of the physician and the 
patient and marginal costs of the patient. 
3.3  Double moral hazard and remuneration contracts 
In contrast to the no-compliance model, we analyze the more general model described in 
chapter 3.1 in the section at hand. Here, the patient’s compliance influences the measure of 
health outcome h positively but at a decreasing rate. Moreover, the monetary health shock L is 
reduced, with La < 0 and Laa > 0. Besides these positive effects compliance is associated with 
disutility which is a convex function. This disutility reduces patient’s expected utility in the 
case of a treatment. As before, we analyze different stages of the game. First, both the physi-
cian and the patient maximize their utilities in the case of a medical treatment non-coopera-
tively (stage three). At this point, we face the situation of double moral hazard where neither  
13
the patient nor the physician can observe or monitor the other one‘s action. In the next stage, 
nature decides about patient’s health status and at the final stage, the insurer sets the insurance 
and payment parameters with respect to the results of the treatment stage. 

































The optimal choice of compliance equals the expected marginal utility and the marginal dis-
utility. For the marginal benefits on the left-hand side of equation (3.15) it is clear that the 
loss-reducing effect of a higher compliance (-La) must exceed the negative effect of a higher 
coinsurance (-β haΦ). Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3.15) one obtains for the 
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The denominator of equation (3.16) is the sufficient condition of a utility maximum. Its sign 
depends on the first term in parenthesis. If it is negative then the whole expression is negative, 
too. The nominator displays the effect of a higher coinsurance on expected marginal benefits 
of compliance and its sign is unclear.
13 The first term is positive and the second term is nega-
tive as long as the term in parenthesis is positive as assumed for equation (3.15). A higher 
coinsurance rate leads to an increase in patient’s compliance if, in absolute terms, the first 
term in the nominator is smaller than the second term. In fact, this result depends on patient’s 
influence on the health outcome h and thereby on the physician remuneration and on out-of-
pocket expenses. 
                                                 
13 This is in contrast to the effect in Schneider (2002b) who analyzes a double moral hazard problem with 
conventional insurance and a fee-for-service remuneration system.   14
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Like in equation (3.16) the overall effect of Φ on a is not clear. The denominator comes up 
with the sufficient condition for a utility maximum and is negative if the first term in paren-
thesis is negative. The nominator is the effect of a higher lump-sum payment on the marginal 
benefits of compliance. The first term is positive and the second one is negative. As a conse-
quence of these findings, the effects of coinsurance parameter and lump-sum payment on pa-
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Simultaneously, the physician maximizes his expected utility with respect to the medical ser-
vices at the non-cooperative stage. The maximization problem and the resulting first order 



















In this non-cooperative environment the physician chooses that level of medical services 
which equals the marginal revenue and the marginal effort of providing health care. The for-
mer is determined by the higher probability of recovery through a higher level of medical 
services and the level of the lump-sum payment. Now, one can ask how changes in the remu-
neration system affect the amount of medical services supplied. Instead, the lump-sum pay-
ment Φ influences the choice of medical services because it determines the physician's in-
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The nominator is the partial derivation of the outcome indicator with respect to medical ser-
vices and is positive. The denominator is the sufficient condition for a maximum and there-
fore negative. The total effect is that an increase in the outcome-based payment has a positive 
effect on the medical services supplied and is referred to as the physician's incentive con-
straint. 
The results above ((3.18) and (3.21)) are essential for the derivation of the optimal contract 
parameters in the case of double sided asymmetric information between physician and patient. 
For the contracting stage, it is assumed that the insurer cannot observe the individual actions 
of the physician and the patient. Therefore, effort contingent contracts are not possible. In-
stead, the insurance company will maximize the patient‘s expected utility (equation (3.1)) 
subject to the physician‘s participation constraint (equation (3.2)), the zero profit-condition of 
the insurance company (equation (3.3)) and the incentive constraints of the patient and the 
















































  β , Φ pUW - σ- β hm , aΦ - Lm , a - Da +1 - pUW - σ
s.t. phm , aΦ - Cm ≥ V








The maximization variables are the patient‘s coinsurance parameter and the lump-sum pay-
ment of the physician. To simplify the analysis the zero profit condition as well as the incen-
tive conditions are inserted in the patient‘s expected utility and the physician‘s participation 
constraint. 
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To interpret the condition above it is necessary to take a closer look at the effects of an in-
crease in the co-payment parameter. If the compliance increases as a result of a higher β 
(aβ > 0) then the left-hand side in equation (3.23) shows the expected marginal utility or reve-
nue gains of the patient and the physician. In addition, the right-hand side contains the mar-
ginal utility loss of the patient due to an increase in β. Otherwise, if the compliance remains 
unchanged or if it decreases the indirect effects of a change in the coinsurance parameter 
vanish or change their sign. In detail, the results mainly depend on the physician’s remunera-
tion regime and the patient’s influence on the remuneration (see equation (3.17)). In case of a 
fee-for-service remuneration, the patient’s compliance has no influence on the physician’s 
payment because this only depends on the medical services supplied, independently of the 
patient’s actions.
14  
It is clear that the result in (3.21) is different to equation (3.11). In section 3.2, the patient is 
fully insured because the marginal utilities if sick and healthy are equal. Instead, in the double 
moral hazard situation the patient faces a positive coinsurance. The first term on the left is the 
expected marginal income of the physician (indirect effect). The second term shows the ex-
pected premium reduction for the patient if he is healthy (direct effect). In equilibrium the 
sum of these two effects equal the expected marginal costs of a higher fraction of medical 
expenses the patient has to bear. The first term on the right is the direct expected net premium 
effect if the patient is ill and visits the physician. Here, two partial effects have to be distin-
guished. A higher expenditure share leads to a lower insurance premium on the one hand and 
to a higher out of pocket expense on the other hand. It is necessary for the implementation of 
a coinsurance that the latter effect dominates the premium effect, i. e. that the patient faces a 
financial loss in case of an illness even if he is insured against the risk of medical expendi-
tures. This can be described as the incentive effect of a coinsurance. The second term on the 
right-hand side is the expected indirect effect of a higher coinsurance parameter on the insur-
ance premium. If the compliance increases through an increase in the coinsurance parameter 
this leads to a better health outcome h and therefore to a higher income of the physician. This 
again will raise the insurance premium the patient has to pay whether he uses medical ser-
                                                 
14 It is clear that ex ante moral hazard may lead to an increase in medical services to achieve full recovery. In this 
case, the patient’s behavior influences the remuneration of the physician and the effect of an increase in the co-
payment parameter may be unclear.  
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vices or not. An optimal coinsurance has to balance these positive effects for both the physi-
cian and the patient and the negative effects for the patient. 
If one takes a look at the derivation of the maximization problem with respect to the lump-
sum payment Φ it is obvious that the first order condition differs from the situation in which 
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As before, the results depend on the sign of aΦ. If a positive effect of an increasing coinsur-
ance parameter is assumed (aΦ > 0) then the left-hand side contains the expected marginal 
benefits of the patient and the physician and the right-hand side marks the expected marginal 
losses in patient’s utility. In detail, the first two terms on the left are the direct and the indirect 
effect of a higher lump-sum payment on the physician’s expected income. The direct effect 
follows from the increase in the payment parameter Φ. The indirect effect depends on the 
influence of this parameter on the patient’s compliance and thus on health outcome. The third 
term is the patient’s expected marginal utility of a higher level of medical services due to a 
higher lump-sum payment. This means that because of the higher payment the physician sup-
plies a higher level of medical services that reduces the monetary health shock L. 
The expected marginal losses of the patient can be decomposed as follows. The first term on 
the right is the direct coinsurance effect of a higher lump-sum payment in case of an illness. 
The higher compensation increases out-of-pocket expenditures and diminishes the patient’s 
net income. The same is true for the second term, the direct premium effect that matters in all 
states of health. The higher reimbursement has to be balanced by raising the insurance pre-
mium to guarantee for zero profits. The last two terms are the indirect coinsurance and pre-
mium effects. Their magnitude depends on the influence of the lump-sum payment on medi-
cal services and compliance and thus on health outcome h.   18
It is obvious that the incorporation of patient's compliance (problem 2) leads to more complex 
first-order conditions. A major difference to problem 1 is the fact that patient’s reactions to 
changes in the insurance and remuneration parameters are uncertain. In the presented model 
we have assumed that patient’s compliance positively depends on a higher coinsurance rate 
and a higher lump-sum payment for the physician. Instead, assuming a negative dependence 
or independency changes the results presented in this section. If one acts on the assumption 
that coinsurance parameter and lump-sum payment positively influence patient’s compliance, 
now a full insurance of the patient is not possible any more. This is due to moral hazard of the 
patient. The difference between equations (3.12) and (3.24), the first-order conditions for the 
lump-sum payment, is that in the former the indirect effects of the lump-sum payment on the 
patient’s choice of actions are neglected. Therefore, given problem 1 the equilibrium is sec-
ond best and the above situation (problem 2) can be described as third best. 
4  Implications for health policy 
The key question for future payment systems for physician services is: In which way are we 
able to finance and grant good medicine? Considering the implementation of an outcome-
based compensation for physician services there arise several problems. First, the conse-
quences of the insurance and payment parameters β and Φ on patient's compliance are am-
biguous. This is crucial if one takes a look at the results presented in section 3.3 because inter-
pretation of the first-order conditions depends on the sign of the partial derivatives of a. Fur-
thermore, not only for the insurance company it is difficult to estimate the effect of insurance 
and payment parameters on patient's compliance and the supply of medical services but also 
to draw conclusions about the magnitude of these effects. As a consequence, the sign of indi-
rect effects in equations (3.23) and (3.24) and therefore the interpretation of the first-order 
conditions are uncertain. 
Second, a related problem is that health outcomes cannot always be identified by the insurer. 
Whether the reported health status is an objective or subjective indicator is not verifiable. In 
fact, one has to ask what the relevant health outcome h for the compensation is. In the theo-
retical model, h serves as an indicator that shows the resulting health status after treatment 
and can be interpreted as the degree of recovery. It does not incorporate that the probability of 
a recovery also depends on the severance of illness, the illness history and other more or less 
random factors. So, medical services and compliance are only two factors amongst others that 
the insurer has to bear in mind when deciding about outcome-based payment systems. For  
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practical issues the indicator h ought to be chosen illness specific. This requires much more 
information about diagnosis, treatment and patient behavior which raises the costs of imple-
mentation. 
In addition to the problem of measuring health outcomes the insurer thirdly lacks knowledge 
about the interdependence of medical services and compliance. Two questions are of interest: 
First, how does the choice of medical services influence the patient's compliance (and vice 
versa)? Second, is it possible for the insurer to assign health outcomes to the actors, physician 
or patient? The first question is relevant with respect to the setting of incentives for both the 
physician and the patient by the insurance and payment system in order to obtain the optimal 
treatment quality. If the implementation of a coinsurance results in higher compliance but in 
lower medical services as a consequence of this increase, health outcome might be negatively 
affected independent of the patient’s contact decision. In such a situation, insurance compa-
nies or governmental regulators face a trade-off: On the one hand, setting the appropriate in-
centives for patients enforces a better compliance and health outcome increases. On the other 
hand, if compliance and medical effort are substitutes, this probability of a full recovery de-
creases (cf Schneider (2004)). The second possibility arises because the insurer cannot infer 
the fraction the patient has contributed to the resulting health status. If this is not taken into 
account, it is otherwise possible that the physician’s compensation depends on a great deal on 
the patient's behavior. 
What is needed for a successful implementation of an outcome-based compensation system is 
information about the productivity of medical services and the patient's health-related be-
havior. Moreover, the reaction of provider and patient to changes in insurance and payment 
parameters and information about health outcomes matter. Therefore, an improved communi-
cation between the actors of the health-care triangle (patient, physician and insurer) is neces-
sary (cf Schneider (2002a)). In this system of health care provision and financing, the patient 
plays a central part. On the one hand, he has an interest in a high quality medicine and on the 
other hand, he seeks insurance with a complete financing of treatment costs. This trade-off 
makes it difficult for the insurer to set the appropriate incentives. A system of full insurance 
gives the patient incentives to consume medical services at no costs but may not give him 
encouragement to provide the required compliance. A high coinsurance improves his compli-
ance in some cases but may lead to a lower demand for medical services which means that 
even essential diagnosis and treatment activities by the physician are not carried out. The crux   20
about the patient's compliance is that it is necessary for the success of medical treatment but 
that setting the right incentives seems nearly impossible. Therefore, in addition to medical 
guidelines, a system of guidelines for patients seems necessary to ensure that patient's health 
related behavior is in accordance to medical treatment. Here, the physician has the position of 
a gatekeeper and is responsible for informing the patient about medical standards and his 
compliance. 
5  Conclusion 
Incentive problems are widespread in health economics. The discussion about the remunera-
tion of physician services and its influence on the supply of health care services plays an im-
portant role in the discussion about the future perspectives of health care systems. Outcome-
based compensation systems for physician services are one attempt to include the quality of 
health care provision into the remuneration. For ambulatory services, these payment systems 
are barely established yet. Among several reasons especially the problems of asymmetric in-
formation are an obstacle for the implementation. In detail, these refer to problems of mutual 
asymmetric information in the health care triangle physician-patient-insurer, the determinants 
of health outcomes and the incentive effect of insurance and payment parameters on individ-
ual behavior. Moreover, there is uncertainty about the measurement of health outcomes. 
Using a theoretical model of double-sided asymmetric information between physician and 
patient, it is possible to show how the optimal solutions for coinsurance and remuneration 
parameters depend on the asymmetric information. All in all, the problems of asymmetric 
information discussed lead to the conclusion that the patient plays a central part in the health 
care triangle and that his behavior determines health outcomes and the effects of remuneration 
systems. 
Appendix 
The first-order conditions derived in sections 3.2 and 3.3 are simplified conditions resulting 
from the differentiation with respect to the insurance and remuneration parameters in con-
junction with the first-order conditions of the maximization problems at stage three. Con-
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Rearranging leads to equation (3.11). The derivation of the Lagrangian with respect to the 
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Together with the first-order condition of the physician’s maximization problem (equation 
(3.8)), one can rewrite the condition. This is presented as equation (3.12) in section 3.2. 
If patient’s compliance is incorporated into the model the Lagrangian of problem 2 is given 
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Together with equation (3.15), the patient’s condition for a utility maximizing compliance, 
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Using the first-order conditions of the patient’s and physician’s maximization problems 
((3.15) and (3.20) ) condition (A.6) can be written as (3.24). 
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